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2-WHm THz= Is A WUL-,(a) Gifts by a parent to a child prior to the execution of a
will are not advancements unless charged therein.
(b) Gifts after the execution of a will are presumed to be
in satisfaction of the legacies named In the will.
J. E. MBmRs.
EQUITY-EXECUTORY CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF REAL
ESTATE-RISK OF LOSS.
In an executory contract for the sale of real estate upon whom is
the risk of loss between the date of execution of the contract and the
date of performance?
The first recorded decision upon this point was the English case
1
of Paine v. Meller, decided in 1801 and consistently followed in England since that time. It is apparently followed by an overwhelming
weight of authority in this country?7 Although many eases have been
cited as contrary to this view yet a close analysis of them reveals that
in practically every instance there is some factual element which deIn fact, only
prives the decision of the binding force of precedent.
two cases have been found in which the court clearly placed the loss
5
upon the vendor in an action in equity. This view is supported to
6
some extent by Dean Pound, Keener,' and Pomeroy.8
16 Vesey Jr. 349.
325 Laws of England, p. 369, and cases cited thereunder.
3
See notes in 22 A. L. R. 575; 41 A. L. R. 1272; 46 A. I. R. 1126,
setting out the authorities. Also 27 R. C. L. 293 and 66 C. J. 811.
'Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 134 (1838), and Gould v.
Murch, 70 Me. 288 (1879), both oral contracts and unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds, and both actions were at law. Phinizy
v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S. E. 796 (1900) (containing dictum in
favor of equitable conversion), and Good v. Jarrard, 93 S. C. 229,
76 S. E. 698 (1912), the vendor-vendee relationship had not arisen due
to the non-performance of conditions precedent. Wells v. Calnan, 107
Mass. 514 (1871), and Powell v. Dayton Co., 16 Ore. 33, 16 Pac. 863
(1888), the actions were at law. In Cutliff v. McAnally, 88 Ala. 507,
512, 7 So. 331 (1889), there was only a weak dictum. Davidson v.
Ins. Co., 71 Ia. 532, 534, 22 N. W. 514 (1887), involved only the construction of an insurance policy. Kares v. Covell, 180 Mass. 206, 62
N. R. 244 (1902), and Bautz v. Kuhworth, 1 Mont. 133, 136 (1869),
were actions at law.
See Cockerill, Equitable Coversion, 1 So. Calif. L. Rev. 309 (1928),
where, after reviewing all the cases in California on this point, concludes at page 325: "No criticism is intended to be made of the decisions in the cases discussed. They are, it is believed, correctly decided on their respective facts. The suggestion made is only that,
disregarding the loss, the vendor was not entitled in any of them to a
decree of specific performance. If this deduction be admitted the
doctrine
of equitable conversion was in no wise involved."
5
Wilson v. Clark, 60 N. H. 352 (1880); Appleton Electric Co. v.
Rogers, infra, note 13.
aProgressof the Law-Equity, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 826-28 (1920).
"The Burden of Loss as an Incident to the Specific Performance
of a Contract," 1 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1901).
85 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.), See. 2282 (1919).
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At least four other views have been advanced by learned scholars
and students of the law placing the risk of loss on the vendor. (1)
That the risk of loss should be on the vendor until legal title is conveyed.' (2) That the risk of loss should be on the vendor until the
time agreed upon for the conveyance of the legal title, and thereafter
on the vendee unless the vendor is then In such default as to be unable specifically to enforce the contract.
(3) That the risk of loss
should be on the party in possession, whether vendor or vendee." (4)
That the risk of loss should be upon the vendor unless there is something in the contract or "in the relations of the parties from which the
court can infer a different intention.u
But despite the eminence of these authorities no courts, with the
possible exception of Wisconsin," have seen fit to adopt their views.
Many times such arguments have been curtly dismissed by some
evasive answer such as this: "These reasons may savor of laymen's
ideas of equity but they are not the law.""
Kentucky is apparently wedded to the proposition that the loss
is upon the vendee" although there is dictum (in no way necessary to
' Stone, "Equitable Conversion by Contract," 13 Col. I. Rev. 368,
385-387 (1913); Griffin, "Risk of Loss in Executory Land Contracts,"
4 Notre Dame Lawyer 506 (1929).
'Langdell, Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction (2d ed.) 58-65
(1908).
2Williston, "The Risk of Loss After an Executory Contract of Sale
in the Common Law," 9 Harv. L. Rev. 106, 111-130 (1895); 2 Williston,
Contracts, Secs. 927-953 (1920); see notes: 6 Minn. L. Rev. 513 (1922);
2 Wis.
L. Rev. 174 (1923).
1
Vanneman, "Risk of -Loss in Equity between the Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate and Transfer of Title," 8 Minn. L. Rev. 127
(1924). On this theory "Possession may or may not be a sufficient
controlling element," id. 143. See also notes: 6 Corn. L. Q. 111 (1920);
5 Wis. L. Rev. 239 (1930).
"Appleton Electric Co. v. Rogers, 200 Wis. 331, 228 N. W. 505
(1930), which appears to adopt Williston's theory of possession as
the test. See notes: 14 Marq. L. Rev. 183 (1930); 5 Wis. L. Rev. 603
(1930).
"Pound, J., In Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 873,
146 N. E. 630 (1925).
"Johnson v. Jones, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 326 (1851).
Here,
although the vendee was in joint possession with the vendor, the court
clearly based the decision upon the doctrine of Paine v. Meller. Calhoon v. Belden, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 674 (1868), only dictum. Martin v.
Carver's Admr., 8 Ky. L. Rep. 56, 1 S: W. 199 (1886), apparently a
decisive holding that the risk of loss is upon the vendee. Marks v.
Tichenor, 85 Ky. 536, 4 S. W. 225 (1887). Here a deed was given but
was not to become operative until the performance of certain conditions, but the court clearly adopted the dictum of Calhoon v. Belden.
Cottingham.v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 90 Ky. 439, 14 S. W. 417 (1890),
upheld an instruction to the effect that a proviso in a policy of insurance against change of title was violated by an executory contract
to convey, decided without reference to an instruction given upon
change of possession. Godfrey v. Alcorn, 215 Ky. 465, 284 S. W. 1094
(1926), held that the vendor having collected Insurance upon the
property holds the money in trust for the vendee. Benjamin v.,Dinwiddle, 226 Ky. 106. 10 S. W. (2d) 620 (1928), wherein the court said:
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the decision) in a recent case pointing to the theory of Williston."
The court said: "Requiring a vendor to pay damages to his vendee
for a failure to convey property is no greater hardship than requiring
a vendor to pay damages on account of his having ignorantly, though
honestly, and after the exercise of all possible diligence bargained
away something which he did not own, but which he believed was his
own. The court in that case (referring to Phnizy v. G'ernsey, stzra
note 4., Ed.) observed that he should be required to pay damages In
the former ("latter", Ed.) case no one will doubt; that he should be
In the former case, ought not, it would seem, to be questioned upon
principle. We have no hesitance in holding that the vendee, in a case
like the present, Is entitled to have a conveyance made to him of the
land and compensation for the loss of the building, provided the loss
thus sustained is capable of computation.""
Whatever may have been the import of the ambiguous language
it was, in effect, overruled in the case of Godfrey v. A7corn," although
the court in the latter case purported to distinguish the cases upon
the ground that in the former, the vendee had only an option when
the loss occurred. This distinction appears untenable when it is considered that the option was exercised. This view Is shared by Prc"In view of the decision in Godfrey v.
fessor Simpson who says:'
"While B's' title bond could not take the place of a deed and was
Insufficient to vest in him the legal title, it did give him an equitable
right superior to the claims of all others having notice. He was regarded in law as the owner of the property subject to his liability for
the unpaid purchase price; his vendor holding the legal title In trust
for him as security for the payment of the agreed consideration."
Of the cases commonly cited to be contra, none Is pursuasive.
Morgan v. Hymer, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 639, 37 S. W. 576 (1876), where, in
granting specific performance to the vendee the court allowed him a
credit for insurance collected by the vendor, apparently upon the
ground that the risk of loss being on the vendee, any compensation
therefor belongs to him. German Fire Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 140 Ky. 27,
130 S. W. 804 (1910). Here the vendee, the U. S. government, was not
to accept any conveyance until it had approved the abstract of title,
consequently, no beneficial interest had passed from vendor to vendee.
Martin Grocery Co. v. Meng Co., 212 Ky. 469, 279 S. W. 661 (1926),
was- decided upon the ground that the vendee, not having performed
certain conditions precedent at the time of the loss, was not in a position to get specific performance, consequently no beneficial Interest
had passed to him.
"Wheeler v. Gahan, 206 Ky. 366, 370-371, 267 S. W. 227 (1924).
The court here denied vendee specific performance with abatement
of- the purchase price, upon the ground that to do so, there having
been a loss to the extent of five-sixths of the total value, would be
to make a new contract for the parties.
" Editor's Nte.-In the Southwestern Reporter this Is given as
only a quotation from the -Phinizy case but in the Kentucky' Report
no, quotation marks are used.
Supra, note 15.
"Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by
Contract: ILI" 44 Yale L. Jour. 754, 759, note 197 (1935). See also
24 Mich. L. Rev. 838.
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Alcorn it may be doubted whether Wheeler v. Gahan would now be followed in Kentucky."
Regardless of what may be the true meaning of the words in the
Wheeler case, the Kentucky court definitely reaffirmed the doctrine
that the vendee becomes the equitable owner from the date of the
contract in the case of Benjamin v. Dinwiddie,2 though not referring
specifically to the risk of loss.
In view of the extreme meagreness of case authority for the proposition that the risk of loss should be upon the vendor it is to be seriously doubted that many courts will feel inclined to change their
present views. The change, if any, will probably come from the legislature.
But regardless of the source of the change, it is the firm conviction of this writer that the risk of loss should be borne by the party
who is in possession. Cogent reasons seem to demand such a change:
(1) The analogous situation of contracts for the sale of chattels where
the vendee has the risk of loss. 2) The better position of the party
in possession to take steps to protect his interest. (3) The common
belief of laymen who contract with reference to real estate that the
risk of loss is on the one in possession. (4) Such a,holding will practically always effectuate the ntention of the parties. (5) The arguments of such authorities as Williston, Stone, and Langdell. (6) The
extremely narrow and isolated application of the present rule, i. e,, to
contracts for the conveyance of a fee simple in realty. (7) The "homespun justice" of the rule.
ROBERT EDwI HlAwoNT1, J3.

PARENT AND CHILD-CAN A
MINOR WITHOUT HIS CONSENT?

PARENT

EMANCIPATE

A

The problem stated briefly is to determine the age, if at all, at
which a father can emancipate his son, without that son's consent,
without rendering himself liable criminally for non-support or aban.
donment, and, at the same time, avoiding liability for debts made by
the son, by pledging his father's credit for necessaries.
The statement that the law must, in case of emancipation, give
its primary consideration to-the rights and welfare of the infant implies that there are other elements for legal consideration. That is so,
The financial condition of the parent is important. If we were to
set an arbitrary age at which emancipation could occur, we would
make a mistake which, after a few decisions, would become so evident as to demand rectification. In a West Virginia case1 a father
had become insolvent and his creditors sought to levy on crops raised
by the labor of the minor child. It was there held that a parent in"iupra,note 15.
ITrapnell, et al. v. Conklyn, et al., 37 W. Va. 242, 16 S. E. 570
(1892).

